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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. STATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER NATIONAL BANKS
Southland Mobile Homes of South Carolina, Inc. v. Asso-
ciates Financial Services Co. I is a major case, not only in South
Carolina, but also nationwide, because it significantly increases
national banks' vulnerability to suit in state court. The decision
construed the federal venue statute governing such suits2 finding
that a foreign bank was "located" in South Carolina for jurisdic-
tion purposes when its only presence in the state was an agency
relationship with an independent financing company. As an es-
sential part of that holding, the court found that the bank's activ-
ities through the financing company were sufficient to constitute
branch banking within the meaning of the federal law.3
The Southland decision is significant for two reasons. First,
all previous cases interpreting the venue statute have dealt with
the legality of requiring a bank chartered in one county of a state
to defend an action in another county,4 which is very different
from asserting jurisdiction over a bank with no other presence in
the state than an unacknowledged agency relationship. Second,
defining "branch" to include agency relationships suggests even
further possibilities for the expansion of state court jurisdiction
over national banks.
The facts of Southland are important as an indicator of how
far the new interpretation of "branch" can be extended. Mellon
Bank had entered into an agreement with a local financing com-
pany, Associates Financial Services, under which money from the
bank was to be used to finance retail purchases of mobile homes
in South Carolina.5 Many of the sales so financed were handled
by a local dealer, Southland Mobile Homes. The suit arose when
Mellon Bank allegedly agreed to release to Southland some of its
1. 270 S.C. 527, 244 S.E.2d 212 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 266 (1979). One
Justice dissented to the denial of certiorari on the ground that whether Mellon Bank was
engaged in branch banking as a consequence of its agency relationship with Associates
presented a new issue for the Court. 99 S. Ct. at 267 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).
3. Id. § 36(f).
4. Two major cases interpreting the venue statute to allow suit in counties other than
the county of charter are Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977)
and Holson v. Gosnell, 264 S.C. 619, 216 S.E.2d 539 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048
(1976).
5. Brief of Respondent at 2.
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bad debt reserve and then failed to do so after Southland had
expanded operations in reliance thereon.' Southland claimed
damages of $742,000 against both Mellon Bank and Associates.
The financing company cross-claimed against Mellon Bank, a
Pennsylvania corporation, which objected to jurisdiction.
In holding that Mellon Bank was subject to jurisdiction in
South Carolina, the supreme court's reasoning followed a series
of progressive interpretations of the federal statutes involved. The
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1348, gives federal dis-
trict courts original jurisdiction in certain types of action and
provides for state court jurisdiction in the following language:
"All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all
other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States
in which they are respectively located."7 Similarly, the venue
statute, 12 U.S.C. section 94, employs the word "located":
Actions and proceedings against any association under this
chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the
United States held within the district in which such association
may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court
in the county or city in which said association is located having
jurisdiction in similar cases.8
Noting that the interpretation of both statutes hinges on
"located", the court concluded that if Mellon Bank was found to
be located within the state, it would be properly subject to the
jurisdiction of South Carolina courts?
Drawing on the case law of South Carolina and other juris-
dictions, the supreme court observed that a national bank has
been held to be located in any county of the state in which it
maintains a branch office."0 The definition of a branch is stated
in 12 U.S.C. section 36(f):
The term "branch" as used in this section shall be held to
include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, addi-
tional office, or any branch place of business located in any
State or Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or
money lent."
6. Id. at 3 n.6.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (1976) (emphasis added).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976) (emphasis added).
9. 270 S.C. at 531, 244 S.E.2d at 214.
10. Id. at 530, 244 S.E.2d at 213.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976).
[Vol. 31
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The court commented that the use of "include" in the above
definition indicates that the listed requirements are merely repre-
sentative and do not preclude other possibilities. Moreover, be-
cause the characteristics are listed in the disjunctive, only one
need be present to find the existence of a branch.12
With these statutory interpretations as a background, the
court examined the facts. The court's holding that Mellon Bank
was engaged in branch banking was based on its finding that,
through its agent, Associates, the bank exercised detailed control
over the lending transactions involving Mellon money. In the
words of the lower court:
[T]he Associates' office in Sumter, South Carolina, received
checks made payable to the Mellon Bank, . . . loaned money
of the Mellon Bank and conducted all business necessary to be
completed with the receipt of the funds and the disbursement
of them pursuant to explicit directions of the Mellon Bank as
to all places of procedure."
Because Mellon was engaged in branch banking, the bank was
therefore "located" within the state for jurisdictional purposes.
The court's interpretation of the federal venue statute is sup-
ported by both logic and case law. Nevertheless, the decision
seems to contain a significant jump in reasoning because previous
judicial interpretations of "located" merely concerned venue in
another county when there was already a clear basis for jurisdic-
tion within the state. Here, however, the question arises whether
a state must also find the presence of minimum contacts and
assert an additional basis of jurisdiction under its long-arm stat-
ute. The court does not address this question, but it seems to
treat the wording of the federal statute as indicating that a long-
arm statute is unnecessary because the statute states that
national banks are to be "deemed citizens of the States in which
they are respectively located.' 4 Thus, if this language is given
its ordinary meaning, the provisions for obtaining jurisdiction
over state banks should be applicable to national banks when
they are found to be "located" within the state.
12. 270 S.C. at 531, 244 S.E.2d at 214. See also First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v.
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969), reh. denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1970).
13. 270 S.C. at 531-32, 244 S.E.2d at 214.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (1976).
1979]
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The supreme court in Southland stated that the lower court
had found the existence of minimum contacts, but the supreme
court did not appear to rely on that fact for the assertion of
jurisdiction. The court's position appeared to be that jurisdiction
was proper under the federal statutes unless those statutes
granted the bank an exemption.'" The unanswered question, in
both the Southland opinion and other case law, is whether the
legislation in question was intended to operate as an express grant
of jurisdiction to the states or merely to prevent national banks
from claiming diversity in actions otherwise properly before state
courts. It has been held that the same statutes entitle national
banks to be treated as citizens of states where they are "located"
for purposes of establishing diversity in federal court,'6 but treat-
ment in the state court context has not been addressed. It is
difficult to conceive a situation in which a bank could engage in
any of the activities constituting branch banking without gener-
ating minimum contacts, but the possibility might exist if the
bank's activities were limited to a single transaction. Considering
the expansive interpretation of "branch" in Southland, this issue
eventually may require resolution.
Southland widens an inconsistency within the federal venue
statute between the requirements for venue in federal and state
court. That section of the statute that applies to federal courts
uses "established," rather than "located," as the key requirement
of jurisdiction. Federal courts have consistently interpreted
"established" to refer solely to the place where the bank is char-
tered,' 7 and until recently, state courts usually interpreted
"located" in the same manner.'" These interpretations were felt
to bestow a privileged status on national banks at the expense of
plaintiffs, because unlike state banks and corporations, national
banks could conduct business in locations where they were shel-
tered from suit. 9 Although the privilege in federal court remains
intact, recent interpretations of "located" have eroded the pro-
tection formerly accorded national banks sued in state court.
15. 270 S.C. at 532, 244 S.E.2d at 214. The applicable South Carolina long-arm
statute is S.C. CoDE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976).
16. Continental Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1903); Cupo
v. Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 438 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1971).
17. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1977).
18. Steinberg, Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas-Achieving Justice Under
the Venue Provision of the National Bank Act, 12 GA. L. Rlv. 161, 161 (1978).
19. Id. at 162.
[Vol. 31
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Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Bougas2' determined
that a bank was "located," not only where it was chartered, but
also in any county where it operated a branch.21 In its expanded
interpretation of "branch," Southland would seem to have elimi-
nated any remaining vestige of a venue shelter in state court.
The venue shelter that remains in federal court is difficult to
justify in view of the purpose of Congress in legislating jurisdic-
tion and venue for national banks. If Congress' intention was to
prevent "untoward interruption of a national bank's business
. ..from compelled production of bank records for distant litiga-
tion, ' 2  why should that objective be preserved in federal court
but abandoned in favor of the convenience of the plaintiff in state
court? The question is especially difficult to answer because there
is no longer any great disruption of business caused by requiring
a bank to produce records at a remote location. 3 Southland
should cause courts to question the reasons for interpreting
"established" differently from "located" and, consequently, to
question the basis for perpetuating the federal venue shelter.
The expanded definition of what constitutes a "branch" in
Southland is that aspect of the decision that will be most impor-
tant to the future development of this area of the law. The deci-
sion invites speculation about what other types of banking activi-
ties, carried on by a bank without a chartered presence in the
state, could be used as a basis for exerting jurisdiction. Future
cases will focus on the interpretation of those activities listed in
12 U.S.C. section 36(f) as defining a branch: lending money, re-
ceiving deposits, or accepting payment of checks. If these activi-
ties are carried on through an agent, Southland indicates, first,
that a crucial element in finding the existence of a branch is the
degree of control exercised by the foreign bank and, second, that
courts will look beneath the surface to determine the true nature
of transactions. In view of Southland, the purchase of commercial
paper, in particular, must be viewed as leaving a national bank
vulnerable to suit.
24
20. 434 U.S. 35 (1977).
21. Id. at 38-39.
22. Id. at 44 (citing Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 561-
62 & n.12 (1963) and First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889)).
23. Steinberg, supra note 18, at 176.
24. Mellon Bank attempted to characterize its transactions with Southland Mobile
Homes as the mere purchase of commercial paper. Brief of Appellant at 4. But see Michi-
gan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963).
1979]
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Besides Southland there is little case law defining a branch
bank; what there is, however, indicates a liberal interpretation.
In First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson,25 two off-
premises services offered by a bank were found to constitute
branch banking: an armored car carrying a teller and a receptacle
for the receipt of packages containing cash or checks for deposit.
In Independent Bankers Association of Georgia v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System," a proposal by a mortgage
company, a wholly owned subsidiary of C & S National Bank, to
establish offices in various Georgia cities was held to be clearly
an attempt by the bank to establish branches. Independent
Bankers is especially significant because the court was willing to
pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary corporation to attribute
the proposed activities to the parent bank.
As a result of Southland, national banks are no longer pro-
tected in South Carolina state court by the restrictions on suits
against them that they once enjoyed under the federal venue
statute. There is even a possibility that a national bank could be
sued in state court on a transaction not sufficient to support a
finding of minimum contacts if the transaction falls within those
activities listed as defining a branch bank. This issue, as well as
the problem of refining the definition of "branch," will be the
focus of future cases. It remains to be seen what impact
Southland will have on the venue shelter still existing for national
banks in federal court.
II. THE SOUTH CAROLINA "DOOR-CLOSING" STATUTE
In Nix v. Mercury Motor Express, Inc. 7 the South Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted section 15-5-150 of the South Carolina
Code" in terms of subject matter jurisdiction to avoid trial of a
cause of action with no real relationship to the state. The case
concerned an attempt to bring suit in South Carolina on a claim
arising from a multi-state fact situation. A collision occurred in
Virginia between a truck driven by an employee of Mercury
Motor Express, Inc., which is a foreign corporation licensed in
South Carolina, and a car occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Hawkins,
residents of Massachusetts. Mrs. Hawkins died in the accident
25. 396 U.S. 122 (1969), reh. denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1970).
26. 516 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
27. 270 S.C. 477, 242 S.E.2d 683 (1978).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-150 (1976).
[Vol. 31
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and her estate sued Mercury and the truck driver Edwards in
South Carolina for her wrongful death. Plaintiff Nix was a Hamp-
ton County, South Carolina resident with no prior connection
with the deceased and was appointed administrator solely for the
purpose of bringing suit in this state. Mr. Hawkins also brought
actions in his own behalf against Mercury and Edwards. When
the lower court refused to grant Mercury a change of venue from
Hampton County to Florence County, the location of Mercury's
principal place of business in the state, the defendants appealed
and the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was first raised.21
In a three-to-two decision, the supreme court dismissed the
action against Mercury for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Change of venue was granted to defendant Edwards, who was a
resident of Florence County.A The decision concerning Mercury
was based on the court's interpretation of two South Carolina
statutes.
The first statute relied upon was section 15-5-150 of the 1976
Code, which states:
An action against a corporation created by or under the
laws of any other state, government or country may be brought
in the circuit court:
(1) By any resident of this State for any cause of action; or
(2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this State when the cause
of action shall have arisen or the subject of the action shall be
situated within this state.'
The second provision of the statute was clearly not applicable,
but despite the South Carolina residency of administrator Nix,
the court found that the statute required a finding of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in the case. According to the majority,
Nix could not rely on his own residency, but for purposes of bring-
ing the action, stood in the position of the deceased. Because Mrs.
Hawkins would have been barred by section 15-5-150 had she
lived, so was her administrator."2
The court did not dispute that the deceased could have as-
signed a fractional share of her cause of action to a state resident,
but refused to find that such an assignment would have avoided
the "door-closing" effect of the statute. The majority concluded
29. 270 S.C. at 480-81, 242 S.E.2d at 684.
30. Id. at 480, 242 S.E.2d at 684.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-150 (1976).
32. 270 S.C. at 483, 242 S.E.2d at 685.
1979]
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that the same disability would have remained because section 15-
15-60: "operates to prevent any such assignment from placing
the assignee on higher ground than his assignor. '34 The specific
language of section 15-15-60 states: "In the case of an assignment
of a thing in action, the action by the assignee shall be without
prejudice to any setoff or other defense existing at the time of, or
before notice of, the assignment."35 The interpretation of section
15-15-60 to apply to jurisdictional requirements, rather than sub-
stantive rights and defenses, was the second essential element in
the majority's reasoning. This interpretation was not supported
by citations to South Carolina cases, although several Virginia
cases " were cited for the proposition that the right of an adminis-
trator to maintain an action for wrongful death depends on
whether the deceased could have maintained an action for injury
had he survived.
The dissent vigorously objected to the two statutory interpre-
tations upon which the majority based its decision. In the opinion
of the dissent, because Nix was a properly appointed administra-
tor whose appointment was not subject to challenge at this stage
of the proceedings, his South Carolina residency satisfied section
15-5-150 and permitted jurisdiction .3 Furthermore, the "door-
closing" statute would not have barred the deceased in South
Carolina had she lived because it is permissible in this state for
a plaintiff to defeat the statute by assigning a fractional share of
his claim to a state resident.38 According to the dissent's interpre-
tation of section 15-15-60, such an assignment would not have
been affected by the deceased's residency because that statute
merely preserves a setoff or other defenses of a defendant and
does not address the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Thus, in the view of the dissent there was nothing in either stat-
ute relied on by the majority to prevent administrator Nix from
asserting his own South Carolina residency for purposes of estab-
lishing jurisdiction.
3 9
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-60 (1976).
34. 270 S.C. at 483, 242 S.E.2d at 685.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-60 (1976).
36. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969); Virginia Electric
& Power Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 3 S.E.2d 172 (1939).
37. 270 S.E. at 484-88, 242 S.E.2d at 685-88 (Ness, J., dissenting).
38. See Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963);
Chapman v. Southern Ry., 230 S.C. 210, 95 S.E.2d 170 (1956); Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co.
v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 216 S.C. 20, 56 S.E.2d 585 (1949).
39. 270 S.C. at 487, 242 S.E.2d at 687 (Ness, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 31
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While the majority's decision may be consistent with the
purpose behind the "door-closing" statute, the dissenting opinion
is better supported by both logic and South Carolina precedent.
The majority referred to section 15-5-150 as a jurisdictional stat-
ute, but it is likely that the actual purpose of the statute was to
codify the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens0 under
which an action could be dismissed, even though jurisdiction was
proper, if the trial could be conducted more fairly and efficiently
at another location. In Nix, jurisdiction over Mercury could have
been asserted under section 15-9-340, which provides for substi-
tuted service of process on any motor carrier licensed by the Pub-
lic Service Commission.4' Because Virginia, where the cause of
action arose, was undoubtedly a more suitable place for trial than
South Carolina, the majority was correct in applying section 15-
5-150 to obtain a dismissal. The opinion should, however, have
stated the court's true rationale clearly and interpreted the stat-
ute in terms of forum non conveniens, instead of straining the
language to find lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Support can be found for interpreting section 15-5-150 as a
codification of forum non conveniens, although not in South
Carolina case law. In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corporation,42
a federal district court sitting in South Carolina noted the lack
of both legislative history and judicial interpretation and de-
cided to treat the statute as embodying the common law doctrine.
In addition, a scholarly treatment of a federal South Carolina
case has advanced a forum non conveniens interpretation of the
same statute as a means of dismissing cases in which minimum
contacts are arguably present but the forum is otherwise totally
disinterested .
4 3
The court's decision in Nix to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction may have been motivated primarily by practi-
40. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-340 states: "If the defendant be a motor vehicle carrier,
as defined in § 58-23-10, jurisdiction may be acquired by service of two copies of the
summons and complaint upon the secretary of the Public Service Commission .... "
42. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). Szantay is noted in Recent Decisions, 17 S.C.L. REv.
631 (1965).
43. Sedler, The Truly Disinterested Forum in the Conflict of Laws: Ratliff v. Cooper
Laboratories, 25 S.C.L. REv. 185, 189-91 (1973). Sedler discusses Ratliff v. Cooper Labora-
tories, 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971), which involved an out-of-state injury and all out-of-
state parties. The case was dismissed on a finding of no minimum contacts, but Sedler
contends the result would have been the same with the presence of minimum contacts
under a forum non conveniens interpretation of section 15-5-150.
1979]
9
Andrews: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cal considerations. If the case had been tried it probably would
have presented complicated choice of law problems that the court
wished to avoid. It is interesting, however, that a conflict would
not have existed between the two states' statutes of limitation.
Although the South Carolina statute runs for six years" and the
Virginia statute only for two years,45 because the action was
commenced within two years, South Carolina would not have
been faced with the decision of whether to try a case barred in
the state where the cause of action arose.4" Conflicts in substan-
tive law may have existed, but the most common and under-
standable reason for dismissing a case was not present. The effect
of the South Carolina court's action was to deny the plaintiff a
forum entirely, because the Virginia statute had run by the time
the dismissal was handed down. Assuming that the court did wish
to avoid trial of the case, the court's interpretation of section 15-
5-150 in terms of subject matter jurisdiction then can be ex-
plained. At an appellate stage, forum non conveniens objections
have been waived, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction is one
of the few ways in which a dismissal can be obtained.
Whatever the court's motivation, it is clear from the Nix
opinion that a South Carolina administrator with no prior
connection with the deceased cannot assert his own residency as
a basis for jurisdiction in the state. The inconsistency between
this holding and the statutory language making the administrator
the only real party in interest in a wrongful death action47 was
not addressed by the court. The opinion also clearly stated that
section 15-5-150, the "door-closing" statute, refers to subject
matter jurisdiction. This interpretation seems contrary to the
probable legislative intent and may have been motivated primar-
ily by a desire to avoid trial of the particular case. Although it
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (1976).
45. VA. CODE § 8.01-244 (1950).
46. The accident occurred on December 8, 1974, and the action was commenced on
November 27, 1976. Record at 1.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-20 (1976) states:
Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife or husband and child
or children of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and, if there
be no such wife, husband, child or children, then for the benefit of the parent
or parents, and if there be none such, then for the benefit of the heirs at law or
the distributees of the person whose death shall have been so caused. Every such
action shall be brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator of
such person.
[Vol. 31
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would not have allowed dismissal in Nix, a forum non conveniens
interpretation of the statute probably would have been ultimately
preferable because it gives courts considerably more flexibility
and discretion in determining what cases to try. The supreme
court unintentionally may have locked itself into a subject matter
jurisdiction interpretation that was never the intention of the
legislature.
Another matter specifically ruled on in the Nix decision was
the scope of section 15-15-60, concerning the status of an assignee
of a cause of action. According to the majority, the statute per-
tains to jurisdictional requirements as well as to substantive
rights, although this interpretation is without prior support in the
case law. In connection with the interpretation of section 15-15-
60, the validity of the practice of assigning fractional shares of
causes of action to obtain jurisdiction in the state was indirectly
addressed. While precedents allowing the practice were not over-
ruled, their continued vitality is very doubtful because any juris-
dictional advantage that might be obtained by an assignment is
negated by the court's holding concerning section 15-15-60. The
question of the validity of making assignments may come before
the court again, but the probable outcome seems clear.
III. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AS AN INCIDENT OF A MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE
Perpetual Building and Loan Association v. Braun" concerns
a pleading technicality that is not only of practical interest be-
cause it involves a very common type of action, but also of theo-
retical interest because arguably it raises an issue of due process.
The case developed from a mortgage foreclosure action brought
by the respondent as mortgagee. The complaint prayed for the
property to be sold, for a receiver to be appointed, and for "such
other relief as might be just and proper."49 There was no prayer
for a deficiency judgment. After the special referee determined
the debt to be $950,000, the circuit judge ordered the sale of the
property. The sale was carried out and a deficiency of $171,835.32
remained as the unpaid balance of the debt. At this point the
issue of a deficiency judgment first entered the proceedings, as
the trial judge awarded the deficiency on motion of the respon-
dents.5"
48. 270 S.C. 338, 242 S.E.2d 407 (1978).
49. Id. at 340, 242 S.E.2d at 408.
50. Id.
1979]
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The South Carolina Supreme Court, in a four-to-one deci-
sion, held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in
granting the deficiency judgment, despite the lack of a specific
prayer for that relief.' In reaching this conclusion, the majority
considered the question from two viewpoints: (1) whether the
lower court had jurisdiction to render the judgment, and (2)
whether the action was permitted under South Carolina law.
On the question of jurisdiction, the court rejected the mort-
gagor's contention that a foreclosure action is a proceeding in rem
and cannot support a personal judgment. This finding is sup-
ported by South Carolina case law. 2 The majority asserted the
proposition that a deficiency judgment is sufficiently incidental
to a foreclosure proceeding that it can be granted under a prayer
for general relief with no specific notice to the defendant. While
there is authority elsewhere in the country for that position,
3 it
is questionable whether there was even supporting dicta, as
claimed by the majority, in the one South Carolina case cited,
McConnell v. Barnes.4 The holding in McConnell, that a foreclo-
sure decree by itself was not sufficient to allow the mortgagee to
rank his claim as a judgment against the estate of the debtor, is
more consistent with the Braun dissent's contention that the
present decision is without support in South Carolina case law.
5
The majority in Braun also found nothing in the South Caro-
lina statutes to prevent the rendering of a post-sale deficiency
judgment. The debt was established prior to the sale, as required
by section 29-3-63011 and the court relied on this fact to find that
the defendant should not have been surprised by the award of the
deficiency. Not only does a deficiency judgment not require a
specific prayer, the majority also found an indication in section
15-39-7601'1 that it may only be denied when it is expressly waived.
Section 15-39-760, regarding requirements for leaving the bidding
open for 30 days, provides as follows: "The provisions of 15-39-
720 to 15-39-750 shall not apply to any suit brought for foreclosure
51. Id. at 339, 343, 242 S.E.2d at 407-08, 409.
52. Anderson v. Pilgrim, 30 S.C. 499, 9 S.E. 587 (1888).
53. Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U.S. 626 (1890); see generally 55 AM. JuR. 2d Mortgages
§ 909 (1971); 92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 448 (1955 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
54. 142 S.C. 112, i40 S.E. 310 (1927).
55. 270 S.C. at 343-45, 242 S.E.2d at 409-10 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-630 (1976) states: "No sale. . . shall be valid to pass the
title of the land mortgaged unless the debt for which the security is given shall be first
established by the judgment of some court of competent jurisdiction ... "
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-760 (1976).
[Vol. 31
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/9
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
if the complaint therein states that no personal or deficiency
judgment is demanded and that any right to such judgment is
expressly waived. 5 8 The court also relied on section 29-3-660, "1
which appears to give a court express authority to render a defi-
ciency judgment after sale of the property. That statute states:
"In actions to foreclose mortgages the court may adjudge and
direct the payment by the mortgagor of any residue of the mort-
gage debt that may remain unsatisfied after a sale of the mort-
gaged premises. ' 6° The statute does not, however, state that a
deficiency may be awarded without a request for it in the com-
plaint.
The dissent's primary concern was the lack of notice to the
defendant. Pointing out that there is no South Carolina precedent
for finding that a deficiency judgment is such an incident of a
mortgage foreclosure that it can be supported by a prayer for
general relief, the dissenting chief justice preferred to place the
consequences of failure to assert a claim for a deficiency judgment
on the plaintiff. Additionally, the dissent expressed the concern
that a defendant, relying on the fact that foreclosure was the only
relief requested in the pleadings, might default and become liable
for a deficiency judgment that had not been fully litigated.6'
Braun addresses a fundamental problem of pleading prac-
tice. While it is inefficient and even unfair to insist that technical
rules always be strictly observed, even under the most liberal
system the least that must be required is that the defendant be
given proper notice of the plaintiff's claim. The South Carolina
court has decided in Braun that a prayer for general relief gives
sufficient notice and the decision, while novel in this state, is
supported in the general body of law." As evidenced by the age
of the United States Supreme Court decision63 that supports
Braun, there "is no reason to believe South Carolina is moving in
new directions in the area of pleading requirements.
While the facts of Braun support the court's conclusion that
there was no prejudice to the defendant by the post-sale judg-
ment, could there be circumstances that would result in such
prejudice? In the case of a default judgment, the dissent's concern
58. Id.
59. Id. § 29-3-660 (1976).
60. Id.
61. 270 S.C. at 345, 242 S.E.2d at 410 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
62. See note 53 supra.
63. Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U.S. 626 (1890).
1979]
13
Andrews: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
100 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
seems justified, and until the court refuses to award a deficiency
in that situation, attorneys should take care to avoid a default or
their clients might be precluded from litigating the amount of the
debt. Another possible problem raised by this decision concerns
the time period during which a motion for a deficiency after sale
would be allowed. At some point the plaintiff should either be
estopped or required to bring a separate action. Otherwise, the
judgment would not become final and the defendant could not be
certain that the extent of his liability had been settled. The court
does not address either of these problems, and their resolution
will have to await future decisions.
Vereen L. Andrews
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